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Thinking And Feeling
In Music
By Ann Stokes
Bloomsburg University
iterature from aesthetics and arts educaunnecessarily complicate the cognitive-sciention furnishes many descriptions of the
tific enterprise.' In this paper it is not diskinds of experiences that western muputed that the inclusion of affective considersic and arts are able to provide. Some auations complicates research into cognition,
thors emphasize the thinking
but the assumption that
aspect of the experience; othfeeling factors are unnecesers focus upon the feeling
sary in our understanding
Over the past two
aspects. Few theorists have
of thinking in the arts is sedescribed
both aspects
riously questioned.
decades, there has
equally or attempted to exFortunately, some excepbeen a grow-ing
plain in depth the relationtions to the general practice
ship between thinking and
of examining thinking and
interest among
feeling in artistic processing.
feeling independently of
psychologists in
Research practices in many
each other can be found.
fields, music included, tend
Over the past two decades,
studying the
to follow long-established
there has been a growing
interaction
separatist tendencies. Thinkinterest among psycholoing (or the processing of coggists in studying the interacbet\:veen cognition
nitive information) and feeltion between cognition and
and affect.
ing (more usually called afaffect. Although there is a
fect) factors are rarely studconfusing variety of direcied together.
tions taken by researchers
Many psychologists who
in the field, Drucker destudy human thinking processes call themscribes one recent position that continues to
selves cognitive scientists. They want to
gain ground. This is a position in which the
know how human beings acquire knowlpsychologist proposes that:
1. "all cognition has an affective context", and
edge, and they search for specific answers
2. "all affect has a cognitive component."
using empirical research methods. In his acShe suggests that this realization has been an
count of the development of cognitive sciimportant
advance in much current thinking
ence, Gardner reports that the decision of
about
the
relationship
between cognition and
cognitive scientists to de-emphasize affective
affect.
With
regard
to
the
second proposifactors and emotions in their research was
tion,
it
makes
sense
to
claim
that every feeldeliberate. It was considered that the incluing
response
to
a
work
of
art
has a cognitive
sion of affect into their investigations would
element. For example, a listener may feel
the energy of the first movement of Bach's
Ann Stokes is Assistant Professor of Music Eduthird Brandenburg Concerto, but that recation and Violin Performance, Bloomsburg
sponse is based upon cognitively-verifiable
University, PA. Her major research interest is
features of the musical piece - the speed,
the contribution that ph ilosophical and psychoinflections, dynamics, textural contrasts, and
logical theory can make to music education
repetition of rhythmic motives. The first of
research and practice.

L

Volume

V; Number 3

https://opencommons.uconn.edu/vrme/vol16/iss5/26

37

2

Stokes: Thinking and Feeling
these two propositions, however, does not go
far enough for the arts. In this paper, I sug-

gest that affect is not merely context in artistic
processing but a necessary and integral component of the process.
The implications of the claim that affect is
a necessary and integral component in artistic processing are important and far reaching
for music education.
Teachers who plan musical experiences for students need to understand how closely feeling and thinking
intermesh when students interact appropriately with music. Music and all the arts provide opportunities for students to develop
not only a variety of perceptual skills, but
also an opportunity to develop thinking-feeling abilities in concert.
Psychologists who research the interaction
between human cognition and affect generally take one of three approaches.
Some believe cognition is the primary mental process
and insist that a cognitive event is a necessary precursor to experiencing a feeling or an
emotion. Others view emotion and feeling as
the primary mental process and insist that it is
affect which provides the cause and/or motivation for cognition. Finally, a growing number of researchers claim that both processes
make an equal contribution to mental functioning and behavior as a whole. This last approach seems to lend itself best to a conception of musical intelligence. In this paper, I
offer a philosophical defense of the claim that
musical intelligence is necessarily described as
a composite thinking-feeling process.

Thinking and Feeling in the Arts
Authors who focus upon cognitive processes in the arts make a variety of claims.
For example, Arnheim identifies eight higher
cognitive processes which he claims operate
in perception:
active selectivity, discrimination, comparison, categorization, seeing in
relation, problem solving, concept formation,
and abstraction.3 Taylor identifies several
similarities between artistic and ordinary
logic. He suggests that the relationship between a musical theme and its derivations is
similar to the relationship between axioms in
logic and the resulting deductions.t
Goodman provides a probing analysis of how
works of art function as symbol systems
which display both similarities and differ-
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ences to a symbol system like language.>
Several authors offer descriptions of artistic rationality and claim important differences and
similarities between rationality or logic (Iohn
Dewey, Frederick Taylor), understanding
(Roger Scruton, Stephen Davis), and meaning
(Edward Casey, Nelson Goodmanj.P
Authors who focus primarily on the element of feeling or emotion in art also make a
wide variety of claims. Hepburn suggests
that it is commonly agreed that works of art
have something to do with emotion despite
the fact that it is "notoriously" difficult to determine precisely what this something is.
Historically, claims have been made that
works of art imitate, purge, evoke, master,
organize, represent, and express emotion?
Among these theories there is common
agreement that feeling or emotion is a necessary condition, component of, or accompaniment to artistic activity, but the authors' conceptions of the function of feeling in artistic
experiences differ considerably.
In examining philosophical views of the
relationship between thinking and feeling in
art, one finds positions similar to those in the
field of general psychology.
For example,
Goodman appears to view cognition as the
primary process in the arts and suggests that
emotions participate in cognition.f
In contrast, Langer views feeling as the generic basis of all mental processes; cognitive and intellectual elements are simply differentiated
aspects of the great range of human feeling
possibilities. That is to say, she suggests that
the major elements of mind - "sensation,
perception, emotion, imagination, recollection, and reasoning"? - in combination are
"a vast and developing psychological branch
of feeling."l0
Other authors support a view of cognition
and affect as co-contributors to musical experience. Discussing emotion and meaning in
music, Meyer views thinking and feeling as
different manifestations of the single psychological process of expectation. 1 I Reid presents an even more fused view of the relationship, suggesting that emotion and cognition in aesthetic response are two aspects
which cannot be separated.
That is to say, a
perceiver looking at a work of art is given
immediately "perceptual facts-charged-with-
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affective-meanmg.vlDufrenne sees a dialectical relationship between feeling and
thinking. In response to a work of art, feeling is immediately intelligent because of
prior knowledge. Yet the culminating feeling
in experiencing an aesthetic object is deepened by both critical questioning and sympathetic reflection upon the work of art. 13
Goodman suggests that many philosophical problems in aesthetics can be blamed
upon the domineering dichotomy between
cognition and emouon.l+ On the cognitive
side, theorists put "sensation, perception, inference, conjecture, all nerveless inspection
and investigation, fact and truth." On the
affective side, theorists place "pleasure, pain,
interest, satisfaction, disappointment, all
brainless affective response, liking and loathing." This practice very effectively prevents
us from recognizing that in the aesthetic experience, "emotions function cognitively.t'->
In experiences with art, Goodman specifically, but briefly, describes three cognitive
processes which involve feeling: discriminations, classifications, and what he calls
"weightings." Weighting is the ability to rank
perceptual input in terms of a particular continuum, for example, greater or lesser importance, greater or lesser relevance, greater or
lesser value. He suggests that cognitive employment of the emotions may happen in
experiences outside art, and sometimes may
not happen in an aesthetic experience. As
an example of the process in daily life,
Goodman suggests that the "classification of
things by feeling is often more vital than classification by other properties." It is often
more advantageous for human beings to be
skilled in "fearing, wanting, braving or distrusting the right things, animate or inanimate, than if they only perceive their shapes,
sizes, weights, etc."16, and if the motivation
becomes theoretical rather than practical, as
it may in certain types of investigation, he
argues that the importance of discernment by
feeling does not disappear.
In the aesthetic experience feelings function in the same manner. "The work of art is
apprehended through the feelings as well as
through the senses. Emotional numbness

Intelligence theorists frequently divide intelligence into a number of differing components. These components may include sensation, perception, memory, rational thinking, and general organization structures.
These five levels are each thought to perform
a different task in the complex activity of
making an intelligent response to an environmental stimulus. In addition, these components are commonly ranked: the sensory
level is regarded as the lowest level of mental processing, and generalized, context-independent thinking as the highest. This hierarchy will be followed because I suggest that
more information is processed at the level of
musical understanding, and that therefore
this level is more complex and more abstract

disables here as definitely if not as com-

than immediate perceptual processing.

pletely as blindness or deafness."
Volume V, Number 3
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/vrme/vol16/iss5/26

Goodman

insists that feelings are not only used for exploring the emotional content of a painting
but the visual aspects as well. An observer
may feel how a painting looks or see how it
feels. "Emotion in aesthetic experience is a
means of discerning what properties a work
has and expresses.tl?
Goodman's claim - that in art feelings
function cognitively - will be expanded below into the claim that eleven cognitive processes are able to operate in art on the basis
of feeling. These eleven processes are divided into three categories of perception,
memory, and understanding:
Perception
•
•
•
•
•

discriminations
comparisons or seeing in relation
classifications or categorizations
abstractions
weightings

Memory or Representation
• schema or percept formation

Understanding
•
•
•
•
•

problem setting and solving
syntheses
judgments
intuitions
interpretation

It is not claimed that this list is exhaustive, but
it does include selected major cognitive processes which may be used in artistic activity.

The Function of Feeling in
Relation to the Eleven Cognitive
Processes of Musical Intelligence

Shuter-Dyson and Gabriel provide a model
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of their view of the interaction of these five
components in musical intelligence. IS In

what follows, however, I will restrict myself
to the three levels of perception, memory,
and understanding. The fifth level of general
organization (or the "g" factor) is disputed by
a number of theories of intelligence. However relevant "g" may be in the domain of
factorial analysis, it seems a somewhat artificial level for the purpose of this paper. Similar considerations are true for the level of
sensation. Although a store of familiar sensory contents are the foundation upon which
the higher levels of intelligent processing
crucially depend, only in theory is it possible
to stay at the level of sensation. One is
never presented with a single sensation in
everyday experience. The environment normally presents such a vast amount of sensory
information that we process only a portion of
it. The mind tends to focus centrally on certain parts of it, to delegate other parts to the
periphery, and to ignore the rest. As soon as
a perceiver notices more than one sensation
either concurrently or in succession, then the
individual sensations are seen in relation to
each other and further organization is required. The processes of recognizing, associating, discriminating, comparing, classifying,
weighting, abstracting, judging, and comprehending sensory data are generally considered to take place at the level of perception.

(1) The Contribution of Feeling
at the Level of Perception
Many studies have been conducted which
investigate the role of cognitive processes
and the way they structure the contents of
perception. Much less is known about the
contribution of feeling to the organization of
perception. I suggest that perceivers often
develop connections and recognize relations
between perceptual elements on the basis of
how those elements feel to them. It is likely
that feeling influences the organization of perceptual input in at least three important ways:
1. Feelings can help observers detect essential
characteristics of their surroundings.
2. The feeling of a particular mood or emotion can organize the focus of perception and
determine what an observer abstracts from a
multiple stimulus situation.
3. Both types of feeling provide an additional
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basis for discriminating, comparing, classifying, abstracting, weighting, relating, and comprehending perceptual input.

The five processes briefly described below
do not usually work alone. More frequently
they are activated concurrently in a variety of
possible combinations during the perception
of a complex stimulus.
Discriminations
The ability to make fine discriminations
with respect to individual sensory qualities,
or "sensory acuity" as Serafine-? and others
call it, is important in musical processing.
This is because the contents of sensory
awareness are the basic foundations upon
which higher level types of musical thinking
are built. The quality of listeners' musical
understanding as a whole rests crucially on
their sensibility to pitch, volume, duration,
and timbre differences. Sensitivity to variations in these musical elements can be developed along two dimensions: the qualitative
differences between sensory contents, and the
lessor to greater degrees of a distinct quality.
But equally importantly for higher-level musical thinking, each discriminated degree of that
quality tends to be processed inseparably with
its own characteristic feeling tone.
Without feeling the qualities of the music,
important aspects of a musical passage may
not even be apprehended at the level of perception. In his discussion of a melody from
the Gavotte in Bach's English Suite no. 3,
Clifton suggests that there is something about
the melody which presents a certain feeling
quality which he is inclined to describe as
energetic.20 This musical quality is not only
in the listener but is also actually in the music. It is an essential feature of the constituent character of the piece, and a listener
whose sensibility did not discriminate the
precise musical feeling of this melody would
be failing to register and apprehend perceptually a primary feature of the music. The
listener's active feeling response (e.g., perhaps enjoyment) to a piece of music is secondary to the primary necessity of first discriminating between the different sound patterns and their felt qualities. Without input
from prior and current feeling responses,
these types of discriminations cannot appropriately be made.

The Quarterly Journal
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· .. it would seem that perceptual intelligence in music is dependent
upon three primary activities: discrimination ... , organization ... ,
and perceptual comprehension
ute to the effective functioning

.... Input from feeling may contribof anyone

of these perceptual

processes in musical activity.
Comparisons or Seeing in Relation
Arnheim suggests that when two objects
are presented together in perception, the relation between them is either one of resemblance or of difference. "Different creatures
vary as to what they are able and willing to
accept as resemblance.t-!
If the relationship
between the two objects is one of contrast,
there may be either a difference of quality or
a difference in the degree of the same quality. In addition, a "figure perceived in comparison with another ... may look different
from the way that it would appear by itself."22 All these comments may be transferred to the domain of feeling. Feelings
may be similar but vary in degree or they
may be qualitatively different. Emotions
have a different feel when they are experienced alone or when they are felt simultaneously in conflict. So the human capacity
for feeling makes it possible to compare the
contents of perception not only for aspects
such as shape, size, weight, color, etc., but
also for how the contents make individuals
feel. Human feeling responses, therefore,
greatly extend the range of possibilities for
the making of comparisons. The hearing of
two musical events as either similar or different can be made upon both cognitive and
affective information.
Classifications or Categorizations
The human ability to remember the feeling
tone of sensory stimulations is important because it provides another way for observers
not only to compare but also to categorize
the contents of perception. Perceptual information may be classified into sensory qualities which produce similar psychological effects and those which produce antagonistic
ones. For example, human beings are inclined to classify colors into two categories:
colors towards the red end of the spectrum

be cold. In this situation, the terms are being
used to refer to both the sensory qualities (the
result of differing wavelengths of light which
machines can measure) and the psychological
effect that these colors have on perceivers.
When sensory qualities are presented in
combinations, the perceiver may experience
more complex and/or more subtle feeling
responses than when sensory qualities are
presented singly. Offering some preliminary
thinking on the topic of sensate development, Witkin suggests that perceptual stimuli
can be ordered in four basic ways: by means
of contrasts, semblances, harmonies, and discords.23 Each type of combination may elicit
from the perceiver its own quality of feeling
response with ever-expanding opportunities
for new types of categorization or classification
based upon those feeling responses.
Abstractions
Langer and Heller suggest that two functions seem to control what is attended to and
what is abstracted from a given stimulus situation: biological mechanisms and feeling
states. Heller claims that the "involvement"
of feeling selects in all instances of perception. Human beings are provided with biological selection patterns, but if we were "to
select exclusively under the leadership of
biological patterns, ... then the flood of
stimuli selected purely biologically would
render us incapable of living. "24 The human
capacity for involvement is not mere accompaniment to human behavior but an "inherent constructive factor" in all the activities including perception - in which individuals
find themselves involved.25
In a multiple stimulus situation it would
seem that feelings frequently determine
which aspects are found prominent. In
choosing to attend to this organized set of
features rather than another, feelings playa

are considered warm; at the other end of the

large part (often below the level of con-

spectrum blues and purples are thought to

sciousness) in the process of abstraction.
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If a listener does not have access to a store of musical schemata , the
processing of musical input will not merely be defective, it will not
be able to function at all. The schemata in use may be primarily
affective ... , primarily cognitive ... , or they may be combination
structures.
The aspects chosen for attention are not
purely subjective; they contain both subjective and objective elements. Certain aspects
of the stimulus may seem prominent at this
moment, and other features may seem more
important later. On both occasions, the features attended to are actually present in the
stimulus situation. It would seem that differing feeling states may lead to the organized
and logical perception of one integrated set
of features in the first instance, and later, to
another equally logical set of features. De
Sousa suggests that it is not easy to give reasons for these shifts of attention; such changes
seem to be prompted by intuitive processes.
Yet each shift of attention abstracts a different
set of sensory information and enlarges one's
knowledge of the stimulus.
Weightings
Once discriminations, comparisons, classifications, and abstractions have been made,
the next step needed may be the weighing
(or weighting as Goodman terms it) of perceptual contents in terms of their relative importance. Feeling is frequently involved in
this process. For example, if one makes a
classification of sounds into the categories of
consonance and dissonance, it may be necessary for a composer to evaluate a sound sequence on the consonance/dissonance
continuum for its suitability to contribute to a
particular feeling quality. In the process of
weighting, some elements will seem more
appropriate for, or relevant to, the current
purpose than others.
From the perceiver's perspective,
Goodman describes how the visual weighting of a painting's features - of volume,
line, or movement - may alter dramatically
from one day to the next with chanzinz
inb
b
terests and new insights.
Emphasis or weighting is not always binary
as is sorting into relevant and irrelevant kinds
or into important and unimportant features.
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Rating of relevance, importance, utility, and
value often yield hierarchies rather than dichotomies. Such weightings are also instances of a particular type of ordering.e''

For an experienced listener, many of these
ratings take place at the tacit level which
makes it all the more difficult to research the
great variety of cognitive processes based
upon feeling. Listeners need to succeed in
weighting promptly and appropriately the
relevance, value, and importance of the musical elements they hear; and unless the tacit
criteria which guide these weightings include
input from both feeling and cognition, the
choices are likely to be defective.
In conclusion, on the basis of the five cognitive processes described above, it would
seem that perceptual intelligence in music is
dependent upon three primary activities: discrimination, i.e., the acuity and accuracy of
sensory registration of both perceptual and
expressive information and its feeling quality;
organization of the information, e.g., byappropriate comparisons, classifications, abstractions, weightings, etc.; and perceptual
comprehension of that sensory information
once registered and organized. Input from
feeling may contribute to the effective functioning of anyone of these perceptual processes in musical activity.

(2) The Contribution of Feeling at the
Level of Memory or Representation
Schemata or Percept Formation
Current thinking in psychology claims that
information is stored in memory in various
modes of representation. Actions, images,
sound patterns, and language all use their
own type of schemata. Mandler defines
schemata as mental representations of experience that guide perception, thought, and
action. These schemata vary on a continuum
from the most concrete to the most abstract.
"They are available for the perceptual elements of an event as well for the abstract rep-
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resentation of its 'meaning' or 'gist'." Events
are comprehended in terms of the schemata
they activate, and different types of comprehension - perceptual, semantic, and structural
- depend upon different types of schemata.s?
Several authors have investigated the interaction between cognition and affect in representative processes. Schemata are viewed as
having both cognitive and affective elements.
Cowan claims that there can never be a cognitive schema without affect. Since schemata
always contain emotional and cognitive aspects, "there is no strict dividing line between the two domains. Schemata vary on a
continuum from those which appear as primarily affective to [those] which appear
highly cognitive."28 In his theory, Sigel supports a similar position arguing that essentially, "no developed schema evolved without cognitive-affective constituents. Particular experiences activate one of the components, which also activate the other or both
depending upon the event in question.r-?
These theories are highly relevant to the
processing of musical events. If a listener
does not have access to a store of musical
schemata, the processing of musical input
will not merely be defective, it will not be
able to function at all. The schemata in use
may be primarily affective (perhaps the recognition of a particular feeling quality), primarily cognitive (perhaps the recognition of a
familiar scale pattern), or they may be combination structures. No sense can be made of
musical input unless the listener has acquired a
minimum of musical schema, or stable "perceptual constructs," as Reimer calls them.30

(3) The Contribution of Feeling to the
Level of Musical Comprehension and
Grasping of Musical Relations
At this level of understanding music, the
processes described at the level of perception - discriminating, comparing, classifying,
abstracting, and weighting - may still be in
use. These processes, however, may be
called upon to organize more complex types
of input as described below. Because the
input with which they have to deal is much
less tied to the constraints of the current perceptual field, I suggest that thinking at the
level of understanding tends to be more
complex, flexible, and creative. Rock makes
Volume
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a similar suggestion for verbal thinking.31 In
addition, the acquisition of competencies in
various artistic media makes it possible to
develop still higher-level mental skills, i.e.,
problem setting and solving, syntheses, judgments, intuitions, and interpretation. These
processes are also constituent parts of the
total complex of musical understanding. The
contribution of feeling to five higher level
processes is briefly described below.
Problem Setting and Solving
Reporting on their research into artistic creativity, Csikszentmihalyi and Getzels suggest
that creative accomplishment in painting crucially depends upon a problem-finding attitude.32 This attitude is characterized by a
painter's openness to a number of metacognitive events: visual, auditory, and kinesthetic sensations; ill-defined intimations and
emotions; both less or more clearly formulated ideas; and a "deeply felt need to bring
personal order into this congeries of problematic experiences. The work of art represents an attempt to discover a visual symbolic expression for this ordering process."33
In each artistic domain "much hard work
needs to be done after the problem is sufficiently formulated to become amenable to
attempts at symbolic solution."34 But no
originality in thinking can take place unless
emotions, curiosity, imagination, and baffling
glimpses of a reality beyond present conceptions influence both the finding and the solving of artistic problems.
Syntheses
Dewey, and others, suggest that artistic
unity is a logical necessity that comes from a
synthesis of parts based upon feeling. Emotion works "to effect continuity of movement,
singleness of effect among variety. It is selective of material and directive of its order
and arrangement.tv>
He suggests that a balance needs to be maintained. Too much absorption in the emotion or feeling may obstruct the necessary elaboration and definition of parts. Too little involvement of feeling will result in a coldly correct product.
Feeling is necessarily involved in choosing
the right word, tone, or hue, of placing the
right incident in the right place, or of arriving
at an exquisite proportion of parts to achieve
artistic synthesis.
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Since feeling is essential to the artist's creation of synthesis in art, perceivers cannot
dispense with feeling either. Petock suggests
that perceivers apprehend the cohesive
forces in a work of art "by taking part in a
process which is like the composerperformer's. Like the artist whose thought
we follow, we care deeply about his materials."36 Listeners who care about sounds will
want to involve themselves in the process of
knowing the parts of the composition and
putting them together in their own experience. It is just as important, then, that a
listener's act of reconstruction achieve an appropriate synthesis of musical elements
based upon feeling as it is that a composer
achieve a feelingful synthesis of parts in the
creative process.
Judgments
Feelings also make essential contributions
to the exercise of musical judgment. In fact,
Jung described feeling itself as a "kind of
judgment, differing from intellectual judgment in that its aim is not to establish conceptual relations but to set up a subjective
criterion of acceptance or rejection. "37 The
process of feeling requires more time than
does perception. "It behaves in the same
way as thinking, rationally organizing perceptions. It is coherent if not systematic."
The object of concern is to be "exactly right,"
not from a truthful or logical sense, but from
the point of view of feeling.38
Judgments regarding the suitability of materials for specific aesthetic purposes, the effectiveness of new combinations, the appropriate balance between repetition and contrast,
of the right relationship between the parts and
the whole, must be made by the artist on the
basis of feeling if the work is not to seem mechanical and contrived. In addition, a perceiver must also learn to make appropriate
aesthetic judgments about all these aspects of
art works on the basis of educated feeling.
That is to say, feelings whose precise nature
are formed by the individual's prior knowledge of both art forms and life experiences.
Intuitions
Langer's definition of intuition is precise. It
is the direct perception of relations, forms,
instances of forms, and logical and semantic
meanings.39 If a listener does not under-
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stand the meaning of a verbal utterance, the
speaker may be able to demonstrate his
meaning by other means -- by paraphrasing
or defining the words the listener does not
know. The significance of works of art,
however, can only be exhibited, and there is
no further way of identifying their import.
The only way to make the feeling content of
a design, a melody, a poem or any other art
form public, is to present the expressive form
so abstractly and forcibly that anyone with
normal sensibility for the art in question will
see this form and its emotive quality40
For Langer, the function of artistic symbols
is to negotiate a variety of intuitions. The
intuition may be the envisagement of an individual object or event, but it may also be the
seeing of relatedness or distinctness, correspondence or contrast, or the synthesis in a
total Gestalt. The contribution of the individual elements to the whole feeling import
is seen intuitively or not at all. The understanding of an art work begins with the
perceiver's intuition of the whole feeling presented, and contemplation then gradually reveals the complexities of the art work and
the complexity of its import, Whether listeners are intuiting or contemplating, I suggest
that their grasp of musical meaning depends
essentially upon the part which affect contributes to the feeling quality of the composition and the input from the listener's feeling
responses brought to the experience.
Interpretations
At the highest level of musical interpretation, both life experiences and language understandings may contribute enormously to
its fine tuning. For example, Manfred Clynes
considers (as have many musicians) that the
last works of Beethoven reveal a completely
new quality compared to early and middle
works. Struggling to describe this new quality, Clynes asks: "How was he [Beethoven]
able to program us in such a way that the
dancinzI:> and the love is not felt as dancing of
our individual egos, the 'I,' but of universal
forces?" In order to experience the great
calm that Beethoven programs, it seems that
a disconnection as well as connection is
made in the listener's internal programming.
"Our own individual drives are disconnected
from their usual outputs." He suggests that
more than detachment is implied. "We are
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The sarne rnelocly can be played exclarnatorily, lyrically, rnatter-offactly, or-with conviction and, in each case, it 'will convey a different
meaning

as a totality.

Cognitive,

affective,

and perforITlance

clernerrts fuse po-werfully together to produce the precise rnearring
of each different -whole.
also connected in an immediate, direct way
to what appears as a source of universal energy and love.,,41
In this late music we remember not only a
specific state, "but the quality of a point of
view, of feeling a different sense of connectedness - a state that allows for the simultaneous experience of energy and peace."42
Clynes insists that the peace of Beethoven's
last quartets is not the peace of a lullaby.

identify some of the individual elements of

any rigid application of my suggested distinctions. Based upon ideas presented by P.
Lersch, Francis Dunlop argues that the formation of psychological concepts is more a matter of emphasis than reality, is more an exercise in accentuating than demarcating. He
suggests that a common problem with conceptualizing lies in the fact that once the emphasizing concepts have been formed, theorists tend to assume that they mark clear demarcations under all circurnstances+t His
point is an important one.
Obviously, the description presented above
of individual components of mature musical
understanding do not present an adequate
picture of the intermeshing of those components. In most circumstances, cognitive and
affective meanings are formulated and understood as a totality. Based on ideas from
Wittgenstein, Heller provides an illustration
of expression. Someone makes a propositional statement, but the actual words are not
sufficient to convey the whole meaning. The
very same sentence can be said "descriptively, exclamatorily, ironically, hintingly, familiarly, skeptically, or with conviction; the
conceptual or lingual meaning is the same,
but the meaning as a whole is not the
same."45 Within certain limitations, I suggest,
the musical performer has the same capability as a speaker with language. The same
melody can be played exclamatorily, lyrically, matrer-of-factly, or with conviction and,
in each case, it will convey a different meaning as a totality. Cognitive, affective, and
performance elements fuse powerfully together to produce the precise meaning of
each different whole.
Unless patients are brain damaged, it is often extremely difficult to extricate thought
and feeling processes in human response.
Oliver Sacks reports on an incident which
demonstrates this point.46 A ward of aphasic

musical comprehension,

patients were listening to a political speech

It is an apparent paradox that this sense of
utmost peace is at the same time combined
with a state of energy. If we examine this
paradoxical combination closely we note that
it is also combined with absence of anxiety.
The strength it gives is not that of the armed
aggressor, but that of the man who is at
home in the wonder of existence. Yet, all
that brought this experience forth are only
sounds, vibrations of the air, tones. How can
these relationships transform us to such an
extent?43

Clynes writes eloquently about the quality
of the music from Beethoven's late period.
Beethoven enthusiasts have also sensed
those features which are so difficult to describe in words, and the new quality may
well have emerged because of profound
changes in Beethoven's attitude towards life.
In addition, Clynes's verbal description may
well help other musicians interpret more effectively the musical character of Beethoven's
late music. Yet satisfactory interpretation on
the part of performers can only take place
when they have grasped through feeling
those extra-musical ideas or qualities in the
music, and are guided by that feeling to
make the performance decisions which will
best present those qualities to the feelings of
the listener.

The Complexity of Musical Understanding
Although I have attempted in this paper to
I do not advocate
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Similarly with music, I argue that without a grasping awareness there
can be no adequate feeling response, and without a feeling response
there can be no adequate

grasp of the feeling quality of the music.

by the president, and when Sacks came into
the ward, they were all laughing at what they
perceived was the president's attempt to
hoodwink the public. Aphasia patients have
left hemisphere damage and are incapable of
identifying words as such. Nevertheless,
they understand most of what is said to
them. When doctors wish to test for aphasia,
they have to avoid all non-verbal emotional
clues. Otherwise, even when the patients
have not recognized the words being used,
they understand the meaning in an emotionally-toned utterance. Aphasics learn to compensate for loss of word recognition by enhanced sensitivity to emotional tone.
In the same ward there was another patient suffering right-hemisphere
damage, and
she could understand words but not emotional tone. Her attention was totally focused
upon the exactness of the words and the
way that they were used, and she also believed that the president was telling lies from
the word content of his speech. It was only
those listeners with intact brains processing
both content and affect, but at lower thresholds of sensitivity than the brain-damaged
patients, who found the speech persuasive.
In artistic activity, the picture is equally
complex. Dufrenne suggests that conclusions reached in the domain of thought have
lasting repercussions upon the domain of
feeling. He offers a convincing description
of how verbal thinking contributes to the
specific feeling qualities embodied in a work.
Thus one can say that the work's affective
quality embodies thought and even that there
is philosophy in every work, whether it be
the bitter and fervent Christianity of Roualt's
paintings, Debussy's sensual and open defiant
openness to the world, or the Parthenon's
Platonic taste for order and measure (not to
mention its exaltation of light and its sense of
the splendor of the true). But since thoughts
are enclosed within their respective works,
they exist in a state of feeling and communicate themselves to feeling. When we reflect
on such feeling, we may try to restore it to
the state of thought. However, this thought is
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living for the artist only insofar as it becomes
feehng.f?
Here, Dufrenne prefers to say that thought
participates in artistic feeling in contrast to
Goodman who suggests that emotions participate in cognition. Perhaps this conflict of
emphasis is best resolved by claiming that
the participation can work both ways.
To summarize, I argue that the understanding of music is a complex synthesis of the
five types of understanding
listed below
which can be developed by using the mental
processes described above. Mandler describes three kinds of comprehension:
perception is comprehension of sensory input;
semantics is the comprehension of language
relations, and preference involves comprehension of structural relations.sf To
Mandler's three I would add two others: artistic understanding (more developed than
preference) also involves comprehension
of
structural and non-structural relations in various media; and personal understanding involves seeing relationships between the general and the particular in human interaction.
I suggest that artistic functioning at the highest level involves seeing relationships between all five types of understanding, with
nonlanguage arts being less directly influenced by the understanding
of semantic relations. Each type of understanding or comprehension, however, is crucially dependent
upon input from the domain of feeling.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have identified a number of
theorists who describe the composite nature
of the thinking-feeling response to works of
art. For example, translating comments from
the visual domain to music, Edward Casey
would say that we hear the contrast between a
series of tones and feel their impact and their
tenston.f? Louis Arnaud Reid would say that
we immediately hear musical tones chargedwnh-affectrve-meaning.X'
These authors remind us of the seamlessness or the wholeness
of the experience during which we are not
aware of any separation between the cognitive
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awareness and the feeling response.
Unfortunately, the practice of studying cognitive and affective elements separately
makes it difficult to further our knowledge of
the intimate reciprocity between the listeners'
sensitive awareness of the stimulus and the
nature of their feeling response. Francis
Dunlop describes the importance of this reciprocity reflecting upon a similar idea presented by Edith Stein. They both insist that it
is important to distinguish between the act of
understanding or grasping (by feeling) a
value and the appropriate feeling-response to
that value. Each element has a crucial need
for the other. "There can be no proper response without a proper grasp, no adequate
grasp without adequate response.vi! Similarly with music, I argue that without a grasping awareness there can be no adequate feeling response, and without a feeling response
there can be no adequate grasp of the feeling
quality of the music.
For complete musical understanding, it is
necessary to become sensitive to the feeling
qualities of a piece of music just as much as
sensitivity to emotional tone in social situations is essential for a complete understanding of what others are saying. Interaction
with music requires that individuals be able
to make discriminations, comparisons, classifications, abstractions, weightings, and to
store schemata on the basis of both cognitive
and affective aspects. Often it is educated
feeling which tells artists when there is a
problem to solve, which problems are important, which lets them recognize the right solution, and which makes the sudden associations between hitherto separate elements that
we call insight or intuition. Listeners use
feeling to recognize the rightness of the
artist's choices and to read the music's feeling qualities. Feeling gives individuals many
of their criteria for artistic judgments, and
without our living experiences of what it is
to be a sentient being, we could not understand or interpret the feeling qualities of art
works created by other sentient beings.
On the basis, therefore, of these descriptions of the contribution of feeling to eleven
cognitive processes in music, it seems necessary to conceive of musical intelligence as a
composite thinking-feeling process. The
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cognitive processes implicated in the comprehension of musical form depend essentially upon feeling components. The feeling
responses necessary for the comprehension
of musical form can become highly intelligent. It would seem that neither dimension,
affect or thought, can exist without the other
except at minimal levels.
Because of this close interdependence between musical thinking and feeling, it is essential for music educators to include opportunities for students to make musical discriminations, comparisons, classifications, etc.
on the basis of how a piece of music feels to
them. Playa passage from a piece of music
in two highly divergent ways and ask your
students which feels best. Although, at first,
they often cannot give reasons for their preferences, their choices often demonstrate
sound musical instincts. For example, if a
new piece with cadences at the end of every
phrase is played to adult students, most
likely they will prefer a performance that appropriately emphasizes whether each phrase
feels like a question or answer phrase as indicated by the cadences. Students should be
encouraged to become more aware of how
contrasting musical compositions evoke different feeling responses. They should be
asked to make decisions about performance
and composition choices, and know that you
expect them to solve varied kinds of musical
problems based upon input from feeling as
well as thinking. A student's interaction with
music may remain defective unless feeling
and thinking skills are developed in concert
at all levels of musical intelligence.
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